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Abstract. This article explores the hypothesis that the differences between our 
conscious sensations (color, sound, smell, etc.) could be linked to the different 
ways in which our senses process and structure information. It is also proposed 
that the organization of our conscious sensations into a conscious perception of 
a three-dimensional world could be linked to our mastery of sensorimotor con-
tingencies. These hypotheses are supported by a number of observations, in-
cluding the appearance of conscious sensations without motor action and the 
apparent failure of sensory substitution systems to generate visual sensations in 
congenitally blind subjects. The article discusses how the correlates of con-
scious sensation and perception could develop in the brain and some sugges-
tions are put forward about how this account could be experimentally tested.  
Keywords: consciousness, sensation, sensory substitution, perception, sen-
sorimotor contingencies, correlates of consciousness. 
1 Introduction 
This article explores the hypothesis that the differences between our conscious sensa-
tions (color, sound, smell, etc.) could be linked to the different ways in which our 
senses process and structure information.
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 It also proposed that our sensorimotor in-
teractions with our environment enable us to organize these sensations into a con-
sciously perceived three-dimensional world. I will start with some definitions that will 
enable me to state these hypotheses more precisely: 
                                                          
1 In this article I am using ‘information’ in a loose non-technical sense. In other work [1] I have 
suggested how Floridi’s [2] approach could help us to develop better ways of identifying in-
formation in the brain. 
 Sensory contingencies. Different senses have highly characteristic ways of pro-
cessing information from the world. For example, the photoreceptors in the retina 
have a variety of response characteristics and spatial distributions, and they are 
wired up in complex ways to bipolar, horizontal, and ganglion cells, which work 
together to produce complex patterns of spikes in response to light. The other sens-
es (sound, taste, smell, proprioception, etc.) also have unique spatiotemporal re-
sponse characteristics that process information in complex ways. The different 
ways in which the senses process incoming information will be referred to as sen-
sory contingencies. 
 Sensorimotor contingencies. Perception is an active process in which we move our 
eyes and body to acquire sensory information. The specific ways in which these 
sensorimotor patterns are structured are called sensorimotor contingencies. For ex-
ample, when I am looking at a line the sensory information remains unchanged as I 
move my eyes along the line, and it alters when I move my eyes across the line.
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When I move my hand from left to right, the visual image of my hand changes in a 
predictable way. 
 Conscious sensations. I will use the term conscious sensations to describe the qual-
itative aspects of our experience, such as red, pain, birdsong, the taste of chocolate, 
and so on. Although ‘qualia’ is more commonly used to describe these phenomena, 
it is a controversial philosophical term, and ‘conscious sensations’ has the ad-
vantage that it is explicitly connected with the senses and can be more naturally 
contrasted with unconscious sensations. 
 Conscious perception. This is our normal experience of perceiving our environ-
ment. While conscious sensations can appear without being referred to a cause or 
object (see Section 2.1), they are typically integrated into a consciously perceived 
three-dimensional world – for example, I see a red bird on the ground, smell it and 
hear the rustle of its feathers. A crude way of picturing the distinction between 
conscious sensation and conscious perception is that conscious perception provides 
an integrated three-dimensional framework that is ‘filled in’ with conscious sensa-
tions. 
This article will explore the following hypotheses: 
H1. Conscious sensations are correlated with sensory contingencies. The differ-
ences between the sensory channels’ information-processing can be used to ex-
plain and make predictions about the qualitative differences between conscious 
sensations - for example, the difference between color and sound.
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H2. Conscious perception is correlated with our mastery of sensorimotor contin-
gencies. Our interactions with the world teach us the relationships between motor 
                                                          
2 This example is from O’Regan and Noë [3]. 
3 A version of this hypothesis is defended by Keeley [4], who gives a useful summary of previ-
ous philosophical work on the differences between the senses. 
outputs and sensory inputs. This enables us to structure our conscious sensations 
in a consciously perceived three-dimensional space centered on the body.
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The context and level of intensity of incoming sensory information determine whether 
it is experienced as conscious sensation (a sudden noise, pain, buzzing on the skin) or 
integrated with proprioceptive and motor information to produce conscious percep-
tion. 
While some authors have suggested that there is an identity between a mastery of 
sensorimotor contingencies and consciousness [3, 6, 7], I am only focusing here on 
the weaker and less contentious claim that there might be a correlation between senso-
ry or sensorimotor contingencies and the contents of consciousness. Since I am only 
examining the correlates of different types of content, I will set aside questions about 
the correlates of the level of consciousness. Given that a brain is conscious, I want to 
know why a particular pattern of activity is correlated with a conscious sensation of 
red instead of green, or with a sound instead of a smell?
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Some sensorimotor theories tend towards the view that patterns of activity in the 
brain and world are correlated with conscious states [6]. This fails to explain situa-
tions in which the contents of consciousness are disconnected from the world, such as 
dreams, out of body experiences, memories, hallucinations, or when the brain is stim-
ulated with electrodes or TMS. In this article I will focus on the more plausible hy-
pothesis that neural activity patterns in the brain are correlated with conscious con-
tents. The brain learns these patterns by interacting with the world; when they are 
reactivated in a trained brain they can potentially be correlated with conscious con-
tents independently of the current environment (see Section 3).
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The first part of this article puts forward a number of observations that support a 
dissociation between conscious sensation and sensorimotor contingencies. I will then 
suggest how the correlates of conscious sensation and perception could emerge in a 
developing brain. Some ways of experimentally testing H1 and H2 are then put for-
ward, followed by a discussion of how they relate to the sensorimotor theories of 
O’Regan and Noë. The article concludes with some implications of these hypotheses. 
                                                          
4 This account of the perception of the external world is similar to Aleksander’s notion of de-
piction [5]. 
5 This is broadly in agreement with Chalmers’ definition of the neural correlates of the content 
of consciousness: “An NCC (for content) is a minimal neural representational system N 
such that representation of a content in N is sufficient, under conditions C, for representation 
of that content in consciousness.” ([8], p. 31). 
6 See [3, 6] for attempts to resist this position, which in my view are unconvincing. While 
O’Regan [7] acknowledges that brain stimulation could induce conscious sensations (p.108), 
he claims that conscious sensations are qualities of ongoing interactions between the brain 
and world, not some kind of essence that is generated by the brain. Some of the commentary 
on [3] discusses this issue, which is covered in more detail in Section 5.1. 
2 Conscious Sensations and Sensory Contingencies  
This section highlights a number of situations in which conscious sensations occur 
without motor action, which suggests that they are unlikely to be correlated with or 
identical to sensorimotor contingencies. The research on sensory substitution systems 
suggests that conscious sensations are linked to sensory contingencies and sensorimo-
tor contingencies are associated with our conscious perception of a three-dimensional 
world. 
2.1 Conscious Sensations Without Action 
A number of observations support a dissociation between conscious sensations and 
motor action. First, we often experience conscious sensations without having made a 
motor action. For example, I am sitting passively in the dark and a bright light is sud-
denly switched on. I initially experience a raw sensation of blinding light, and then 
my eyes adapt, I start to saccade and I perceive a structured world. The phenomenol-
ogy is similar with a sudden noise: at first I am startled by the noise, which swamps 
my senses and I am consumed by the sensation of it; some moments later I locate the 
source and nature of the sound.  
Second, experiments have shown that conscious sensations can be produced by 
very brief stimuli – for example, a 1ms flash of light can cause a conscious visual 
sensation; a conscious auditory sensation can be elicited by a 1ms auditory click [9]. 
The duration of these stimuli is much less than the timescale of motor actions that 
could actively explore them (the eyes saccade every ~200ms; ear and head move-
ments take much longer).  
Third, many conscious body sensations, such as heartburn and pain, do not have an 
obvious motor component – they just happen to us and we do not have to move or do 
anything to make them happen or go away. All of these observations suggest that 
motor action is not necessary for conscious sensations.
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2.2 Direct Brain Stimulation Produces Conscious Sensations 
Conscious sensations can be evoked by directly stimulating the brain of a passive 
subject. For example, a blow to the head, a TMS pulse or electrode stimulation pro-
duces phosphenes, memories, body sensations and sounds [10, 11]. 
2.3 Sensory Substitution Systems 
The phenomenology of people’s use of sensory substitution systems is easily ex-
plained by a distinction between conscious sensation and perception. For example, in 
a tactile visual substitution system (TVSS) a two-dimensional array of vibrators is 
                                                          
7 O’Regan [7] acknowledges that vision can occur without action, and claims that being poised 
for action is enough, even if the action is not executed (p. 67). 
placed on the body
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 and connected to visual information from a camera that is typical-
ly mounted on the head [12]. If the subject does not move, they typically experience a 
buzzing on the surface of their body. While little or no explanation of this buzzing 
sensation is offered by a sensorimotor theory of consciousness, it becomes easier to 
understand if there is a correlation between somatosensory contingencies and con-
scious buzzing sensations (H1).  
When subjects are allowed to move the camera, the buzzing sensation is trans-
formed into perception of a spatially organized world.
9
 However, although congeni-
tally blind subjects can use a TVSS to perceive a three-dimensional environment, this 
is not enough to give them a conscious sensation of light. Visually handicapped peo-
ple expressed disappointment with these devices for this reason [13].
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The absence of conscious visual sensations in congenitally blind subjects is sup-
ported by a study in which normally sighted and congenitally blind subjects were 
trained on a tongue-mounted TVSS. Before training the blind subjects did not report 
any tactile sensations on their tongues when TMS was applied to their visual cortex. 
After training the TMS caused some of the blind subjects to experience somatopically 
organized tactile sensations on their tongues. The application of TMS to the same 
brain areas of the normally sighted subjects caused them to experience visual 
phosphenes both before and after the training [15]. This suggests that the TVSS train-
ing increased the blind subjects’ ability to perceive the world through tactile sensa-
tions on their tongues, but it did not give them the conscious sensation of light.
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While H1 predicts that congenitally blind subjects using a TVSS will not experi-
ence conscious visual sensations, a limited amount of visual experience would be 
expected in non-congenitally blind or normal subjects. Once these subjects have 
learnt to use the TVSS, they can use their memory and imagination to generate visual 
images of the world that they are perceiving through the buzzing sensations. There are 
also a considerable number of cross-sensory connections in the brain, which could 
lead to visual areas being activated in response to other sensory stimulation - a phe-
nomena that appears most strongly in synaesthesia. 
                                                          
8 In some TVSSs a two dimensional array of electrodes is placed on the tongue: a small voltage 
produces a tingling sensation. 
9 Subjects have to spend some time practicing with the device before this occurs. 
10 The first person report of a congenitally blind person’s experience with a TVSS [14] is some-
times cited as a counter-example to this claim. However, Guarniero’s description of ‘seeing’ 
with the device is much more akin to spatial perception, than encountering what for him 
would be a novel conscious sensation: “As I have noted at the beginning of this paper, I 
have used the word ‘see’ for lack of a better. The difficulty is not merely one of vocabulary; 
rather it is a conceptual one. Very soon after I had learned how to scan, the sensations no 
longer felt as if they were located on my back, and I became less and less aware that vibrat-
ing pins were making contact with my skin. By this time objects had come to have a top and 
bottom; a right side and a left; but no depth – they existed in an ordered two-dimensional 
space, the precise location of which has not yet been determined.” (p. 104) 
11 Similar interpretations of TVSS experiments are given by Keeley [4], Block [16] and Prinz 
[17]. 
The limitations of sensory substitution systems also support a dissociation between 
conscious sensations and sensorimotor contingencies. While some success has been 
achieved with devices that substitute vision using audio or somatosensory stimulation, 
no-one has created a taste or pain sensory substitution device, and it is very difficult 
to imagine how this could work. We might try to build a vision-taste substitution sys-
tem by giving a person a tasteless object to chew while they look at a display showing 
the sensory patterns that are produced by the taste receptors [18]. However, it seems 
inconceivable that such a system could evoke the sensation of bitterness or sweetness 
in a subject, and similar problems exist with the substitution of pain or smell.
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2.4 Ockham’s Razor 
Some theories of consciousness claim that sensorimotor patterns can be used to ex-
plain the differences between our senses (for example, [3]). However, if sensory con-
tingencies contain enough information to differentiate the senses, then it might not be 
necessary to include motor actions in our explanations as well. If we are looking for a 
minimal set of spatiotemporal structures in the brain that are correlated with conscious 
sensations, then we should start with sensory contingencies, and carry out experi-
ments to see if these provide enough information to make accurate predictions about 
conscious contents (see Section 4).  
2.5 Conscious Sensations without Sensorimotor Contingencies 
In some situations people experience conscious sensations that they cannot systemati-
cally integrate with their actions [19]. For example, people who have had their sight 
restored after a cataract operation often have mixed-up sensations of color, movement 
and light and do not know how to use their eye movements to perceive the world [20]. 
A similar situation occurs when people wear inverting glasses that disrupt the normal 
relationship between changes in the visual world and eye and body movements. When 
subjects put on these glasses they are initially extremely disoriented and find it very 
difficult to perceive or interact with the world. Gradually they mastery the sensorimo-
tor contingencies of the inverting glasses and learn to perceive and act in the world 
again [21]. 
While Noë [19] describes these situations as ‘experiential blindness’, it is more ac-
curate to describe them as cases of perceptual blindness, since the subjects can expe-
rience a variety of color, light and movement sensations. They are perceptually blind 
because they do not know the sensorimotor rules that would enable them to coordi-
nate their experiences into a consciously perceived world. People become experien-
                                                          
12 One way of explaining the limited success of sensory substitution systems is that they pro-
vide information that can be accessed through a number of different sensory channels, but 
they cannot substitute information that is only present in a single sensory channel. 
13 Some of these points were made by Fiona MacPherson in her talk ‘Sensory Substitution and 
Augmentation: Introduction to the Issues’ at the conference on Sensory Substitution and 
Augmentation, British Academy, London, 26th March 2013. 
tially blind (lose conscious visual sensations) if their sensory apparatus (eyes, optic 
nerves, visual cortex, etc.) is damaged. 
3 The Correlates of Conscious Sensation and Perception 
The observations outlined so far suggest that there is a connection between conscious 
sensations and sensory contingencies in the brain. However, conscious sensations 
cannot be directly correlated with the low-level processing of the individual senses 
because they can occur without the activation of the sensory hardware – for example, 
conscious visual sensations can be triggered by TMS independently of the retina. A 
more plausible hypothesis is that the cortical areas connected to each sensory channel 
learn to respond to the sensory contingencies of that channel, which enables them to 
reproduce the sensory contingencies in the absence of stimulation from the senses. 
Research on the neural correlates of consciousness has indicated that low level senso-
ry areas, such as V1, are only weakly correlated with consciousness [22]. This sug-
gests that the brain areas which are correlated with conscious sensations are likely to 
be higher up the sensory processing hierarchies. 
 The developing cortex is only roughly wired up using chemical gradients and oth-
er mechanisms, and so the differences between our conscious sensations are unlikely 
to be linked to genetically wired connection patterns. It is more likely that the devel-
oping cortex learns to respond to incoming sensory patterns using synaptic pruning 
and other processes, which leads to substantially different structures and response 
characteristics in the different sensory areas [23]. In the womb the data that it is avail-
able for this learning process includes random noise in the sensors (retina, cochlea, 
etc.) and environmental stimulation (sound, light, taste and smell). Once a cortical 
area has learnt to respond to a set of sensory contingencies, artificial stimulation of 
the area will produce a noisy version of the corresponding sensation – for example, 
TMS stimulation of trained visual cortex leads to phosphenes. 
The structuring of the cortex in response to sensory stimulation patterns has been 
experimentally demonstrated in ferrets and hamsters. For example, in work carried 
out by Sur et al. [23] the visual pathways in neonatal ferrets were redirected to the 
auditory cortex. Many of the neurons in the rewired auditory cortex developed visual 
response characteristics similar to those in V1, although there were some differences 
between orientation selective cells in V1 and the rewired cortex.
14
 Similar results have 




                                                          
14 Some of the differences between rewired visual cortex and normal visual cortex could be due 
to the fact that the rewiring was carried out postnatally. 
15 It might be objected that people who have had their sight restored by a cataract or cornea 
operation have conscious visual sensations, although their cortex has apparently had no 
chance to learn to respond to visual information during early childhood. However, this type 
of operation is only carried out on patients with functional retinas [20]. This type of subject 
perceives a limited amount of light through the surface of the eye, which is enough to stimu-
late the cortex with visual sensory contingencies. 
The development of the mechanisms linked to conscious perception probably oc-
curs during late embryological development and after birth, when the child learns how 
its motor actions generate predictable patterns of sensory information. This probably 
strengthens the connections between the learnt sensory contingency patterns, proprio-
ceptive areas and motor output areas.  
4 Testing H1 and H2 
The first step in the testing of hypotheses H1 and H2 is the recording of cortical activ-
ity in which the sensory and sensorimotor contingencies that might be correlated with 
conscious contents can be found. A variety of techniques can be used to identify 
mathematical regularities in this data, which can be used to generate testable predic-
tions about conscious sensations and perception. 
4.1 Data 
The first step in the recording of data is the identification of the parts of the brain that 
contain the sensory contingencies which could be correlated with conscious content. 
These can be identified by experiments on the correlates of consciousness, using bin-
ocular rivalry, the subliminal presentation of stimuli or other techniques [22]. Once 
appropriate areas of the brain have been identified we need to record the sensory and 
sensorimotor contingency patterns that the cortex has learnt as a result of its stimula-
tion from the senses.  
This type of data is difficult to record in humans because of the low spatial and/or 
temporal resolution of fMRI and EEG, and electrodes can only be implanted in a lim-
ited number of sites when patients are being operated on for other reasons. In animals 
optogenetic techniques are reaching the point at which they can record from up to 
100,000 neurons at 1 Hz from zebrafish larvae [26], and it is becoming possible to 
record from a few tens of thousands of neurons close to the surface of the cortex of a 
mammalian brain. The problem with using data recorded from animals is that their 
sensory contingencies are likely to be very different from our own, and so predictions 
about conscious sensations based on this data are likely to be specific to the animals 
that it is taken from. 
A more systematic way of understanding how the cortex learns sensory contingen-
cies would be to prepare samples of embryological cortical tissue and expose them to 
patterns of activity from different senses. The stimulation patterns could be generated 
using spike conversion libraries, which have been developed for visual, propriocep-
tive and auditory data [27, 28]. If the picture sketched out in Section 3 is correct, these 
pieces of cortex should self-organize in response to the incoming data and exhibit 
different spontaneous activity patterns once they had been trained. To minimize the 
difficulties of working with in vitro tissue, this approach could be prototyped on 
simulated neural tissue – the models developed by Izhikevich and Edelman [29] or 
Markram [30] would be good starting points for this work. 
4.2 Mathematical Regularities in the Data 
Once the sensory and sensorimotor contingency patterns have been recorded we need 
to find a way of describing these patterns that is generalizable across individuals and 
can make accurate predictions about conscious sensations and perceptions. The re-
search on brain reading using fMRI has used inferred models and statistics to make 
fairly accurate predictions about conscious contents, to the extent of decoding peo-
ple’s dreams [31] or reconstructing the videos they are watching [32]. However, these 
techniques are based on data with low spatial and temporal resolution, and they typi-
cally have to be fine tuned for each individual. This suggests that they have not com-
pletely captured the correlates of conscious contents in the brain. 
An alternative way of tackling this problem would be to take inspiration from 
physics and look for mathematical regularities in the sensory and sensorimotor pat-
terns that are not specific to any individual person. These could be expressed using 
sets of differential equations, category theory or some other mathematical formalism. 
The mathematical equations in physics are typically written down by an expert scien-
tist, and this approach has been taken in consciousness science by Tononi [33], who 
has developed algorithms for generating a mathematical structure that is predicted to 
correspond to the contents of consciousness.  
The central problem with the use of an expert scientist to compose the equations is 
that the regularities that develop in the cortex in response to sensory and sensorimotor 
contingencies might be too complicated to be captured in equations that are written 
down by a human. To avoid this problem, machine learning techniques could be used 
to infer the equations from recordings of cortical data. A computational approach to 
the discovery of scientific knowledge has shown promise in a number of areas [34-
36], and it could be a good way of identifying potentially complex regularities in 
brain activity patterns that are correlated with conscious sensation and perception. 
A more radical approach would be to develop a mathematical model of how data is 
transformed by the senses and learnt by the cortex [37]. While it would be more ele-
gant to infer the sensory contingencies from the structure of the sensory apparatus, the 
ways in which the cortex learns to respond to this information might be too complex 
for an analytical mathematical treatment. 
4.3 Predictions 
Once the sensory and sensorimotor contingency patterns have been identified and 
mathematically described they could be used to make predictions about conscious 
sensations and perceptions in humans.
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 One approach would be to use the inferred 
mathematical regularities to make predictions about how sensory and sensorimotor 
contingencies would appear in fMRI or EEG data. Ideally the model should be able to 
specify how the sensory contingencies corresponding to different colors, sounds, etc 
                                                          
16 Predictions about conscious content in animals are difficult to test. While they can generate a 
behavioral output in response to a stimulus that is assumed to be conscious, they have no 
way of describing their conscious contents. 
would appear in an fMRI or EEG recording, which would enable testable predictions 
to be made about subjects’ first person reports. 
5 H1 and H2 in Relation to other Sensorimotor Theories 
While the hypotheses of this paper have been influenced by O’Regan and Noë’s work 
on sensorimotor theory [3, 6, 7, 19], there are important differences between H1 and 
H2 and their account of conscious experience. O’Regan and Noë would be likely to 
broadly agree on the following points: 
1. The brain does not contain a rich set of internal representations of the world. 
2. Conscious sensations are linked to sensorimotor contingencies. 
3. Conscious perceptions are linked to sensorimotor contingencies. 
4. While the brain plays a role in conscious sensation and perception, the world is 
likely to be necessary for some types of conscious experience. 
5. Sensorimotor theory can explain the link between physical world and conscious-
ness. 
In this paper I have argued that conscious perception is linked to our mastery of sen-
sorimotor contingencies (H2) and I have focused on a correlates-based approach to 
consciousness that does not seek to explain the relationship between the physical 
world and consciousness. I also think that the physiology of the eye and research on 
change blindness and inattentional blindness (for example, [38, 39]) demonstrate that 
we do not have a rich set of internal representations that accurately track the world. 
This leaves two main points of disagreement: the extent to which brain activity is 
correlated with consciousness and the link between sensorimotor contingencies and 
conscious sensation. I will consider these in turn. 
5.1 Consciousness and the Brain 
A significant difference between the position outlined in this paper and sensorimotor 
theorists, such as O’Regan and Noë, is the idea that conscious sensation and percep-
tion are correlated with brain activity alone, rather than with the brain and world (see 
Section 1). For example, in their joint paper O’Regan and Noë [3] claim: 
There can therefore be no one-to-one correspondence between visual experi-
ence and neural activations. Seeing is not constituted by activation of neural 
representations. Exactly the same neural state can underlie different experienc-
es, just as the same body position can be part of different dances. (p. 966) 
A less radical position can be found in Noë’s [19] later work: “A reasonable bet, at 
this point, is that some experience, or some features of some experiences, are, as it 
were, exclusively neural in their causal basis, but that full-blown, mature human expe-
rience is not.” (p. 218). To discuss the role of the brain in relation to O’Regan and 
Noë’s theories, I will distinguish between two types of conscious experience:  
1. Online conscious perception. Detailed information from the environment can be 
accessed on demand. Colors are vivid; sounds are loud and clear; objects are sta-
ble. 
2. Offline conscious experiences. These include experiences induced by brain stimu-
lation, dreams, imagination, phantom limbs, out-of-body experiences and halluci-
nations Offline conscious experiences are often unstable, low resolution and low 
intensity, and their content is independent of the state of the environment. Con-
scious sensations are present in some or all of the sensory modalities and the states 
are weakly perceptual – for example, we see objects but cannot interact with them 
in a systematic way. 
Although there is some overlap between these two types of experience (for example, 
people can mistake phantom limbs for actual limbs [40]), they are reasonably distinct 
categories for most people. Since the first type of experience is typically produced as 
the brain interacts with its environment, it is difficult to prove that it is just correlated 
with brain activity. In the second type of experience, conscious sensations and a lim-
ited form of conscious perception occur without any interaction between the brain and 
its environment, which suggests that the second type of experience is correlated with 
brain activity alone.  
While it has not been proved that online conscious perceptual experiences are sole-
ly correlated with brain activity, it seems reasonable to make this into a working as-
sumption, which can be tested using the experimental approach outlined in Section 4. 
Noë’s bet that this type of conscious experience is not exclusively correlated with 
neural activity is a different working hypothesis, which can also be experimentally 
tested. 
5.2 Conscious Sensations and Sensorimotor Contingencies 
A substantial amount of evidence was presented in Section 2 which strongly suggests 
that conscious sensations can occur without motor action. This supports a dissociation 
between conscious sensations and sensorimotor contingencies. This would be falsified 
if conscious sensations could be produced without the activation of sensory contin-
gency patterns in the cortex - for example, if the conscious sensation of red could be 
induced by a TVSS.  
Section 2.3 set out evidence in favor of the claim that no device capable of induc-
ing conscious sensations has been created. While O’Regan [7] cites Guarniero’s expe-
riences with the device as a possible counterexample, I argued in Footnote 10 that 
Guarniero’s description of ‘seeing’ with the device is much more akin to spatial per-
ception, than encountering what for him would be a novel conscious sensation. 
O’Regan [7] also suggests that the limited capabilities of the current sensory substitu-
tion systems are likely to be preventing them from inducing conscious sensations: 
…current techniques of visual-to-tactile and visual-to-auditory substitution are 
a long way from the goal of achieving a real sense of vision. Using tactile or 
auditory stimulation, it is possible only to provide a few aspects of normal vis-
ual impressions, like the quality of being “out there” in the world, and of con-
veying information about spatial layout and object form. But the “image-like” 
quality of vision still seems far away. Indeed, because the eye is such a high-
resolution sensor, it will probably never be possible to attain true substitution 
of the image-like quality of vision. (pp. 142-3) 
O’Regan goes on to discuss other substitution systems, such as a glove designed to 
provide touch sensations for leprosy patients [41] and vestibular substitution systems. 
In the glove experiments, subjects experienced touch sensations on the forehead as if 
they were on the glove However, this is not an example of sensory substitution be-
cause it only altered the location of a conscious sensation - it did not provide the in-
formation from one sense through a different sensory channel. The apparent success 
of vestibular substitution systems also does not count against H1 because vestibular 
information is not obviously correlated with conscious sensations. 
It might be claimed that a device capable of sensory substitution could be created, 
and that the possibility of this device invalidates H1. However, people have very dif-
ferent intuitions in this area and imagination and thought experiments are rarely an 
accurate guide to what is possible in the real world. While I agree that H1 would be 
invalidated by an actual sensory substitution device that induces conscious sensations, 
the question cannot be decided by people’s competing intuitions about whether this 
could or could not be constructed. 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
This article has argued that the qualitative aspects of conscious experience (conscious 
sensations) are correlated with sensory contingencies (H1), and that the organization 
of conscious sensations into a three-dimensional consciously perceived world is 
linked to our mastery of sensorimotor contingencies (H2). I have suggested that the 
sensory and sensorimotor patterns that are correlated with consciousness are located 
in the cortex, which learns to respond to the output of the different sensory channels. 
The hypotheses of this paper can be tested by using machine learning techniques to 
infer mathematical descriptions of sensory and sensorimotor contingency patterns, 
which can be used to generate predictions about conscious sensations and perceptions. 
This article’s approach to conscious content could extend and complement previ-
ous theories about neural representation that have been put forward. For example, it 
has been suggested that the place of a neuron in a hierarchy or population determines 
its representational content, and there are a number of interpretations of the neural 
code (for example, firing rate or spike timing relationships). The problem with these 
theories of neural representation is that they are generally based on correlations be-
tween neural activity and states of the world, which limits their ability to systemati-
cally account for differences in conscious contents – for example, why pattern P in 
population X is correlated with a red sensation and pattern Q in population Y is corre-
lated with the sound of a police siren. In this article I have put forward a more theory-
driven approach, which could improve our ability to identify correlations between 
neural activity and conscious sensations and perceptions. 
The distinction between sensory and sensorimotor contingencies can help us to un-
derstand some of the limitations of sensory substitution devices. While they can suc-
cessfully encode sensorimotor contingencies, they cannot alter or replace the contin-
gent ways in which the sensory channels process information, and so people using 
them do not have the conscious sensations that correspond to the substituted sense 
(vibrations on the tongue do not induce conscious visual sensations). To effectively 
substitute conscious sensations, it would be necessary to model the sensory contin-
gencies of a particular sense and feed the information directly into the cortex.  
While sensory substitution systems have succeeded in transforming and augment-
ing our current sensations and perceptions, it is debatable whether they have been able 
to generate novel sensations.
17
 According to the hypotheses put forward in this article, 
a novel conscious sensation could be induced in a subject by a sensory channel with 
unique sensory contingencies. This would have to be directly connected to the cortex, 
which would have to learn to respond to it over an extended period. Although 
optogenetics or implanted electrodes would be ideal for this task, there are few situa-
tions in which these can be used in human subjects. A more practical method would 
be to use focused ultrasound [43] or high-definition transcranial direct current stimu-
lation to deliver an appropriate signal to the brain.
18
 Alternatively, it might be possible 
to use an inverse model to cancel out the sensory contingencies of a particular chan-
nel. For example, perhaps one could develop an inverse model of the retina and early 
visual cortex and apply this to visual data to cancel out the effects of visual pro-
cessing. This might enable data free of visual sensory contingencies to be passed di-
rectly to the brain. Further research is needed to determine the feasibility of this ap-
proach. 
This article has focused on the possibility that conscious sensations could be corre-
lated with sensory contingencies. I have not attempted to address the ‘hard’ problem 
of consciousness or tried to explain the relationship between patterns of brain activity 
and conscious sensations. Elsewhere I have argued that our inability to imagine the 
physical world will make it impossible to develop an intuitively satisfying explanation 
of the relationship between consciousness and brain activity.
19
 However, empirical 
work on the correlates of consciousness could lead to the development of mathemati-
cally formulated theories that can map with high accuracy between brain activity and 
conscious states. This might make us more willing to abandon our desire for intuitive-
ly satisfying explanations in consciousness science, just as we have given up hope of 
intuitively satisfying explanations in quantum mechanics. 
                                                          
17 It has been suggested that the the feelSpace belt could provide a qualitatively new perceptual 
experience [42]. However, the first person reports suggest that subjects’ existing sense of 
space, location and landmarks was expanded and made more accurate, not that an entirely 
novel conscious sensation was created.  
18 This technology is being developed by Soterix: http://soterixmedical.com/hd-tdcs. The spa-
tial resolution would probably have to be improved before it could be used for sensory sub-
stitution. 
19 David Gamez, ‘The Hard and the Real Mind Body Problem’, unpublished. Available at: 
http://www.davidgamez.eu/papers/Gamez_MindBodyProblem.pdf 
Further research is also needed to determine whether all sensory contingency pat-
terns are correlated with conscious sensations
20
 and why some senses are richer and 
more vivid than others.
21
 Finally, the hypotheses put forward in this article could help 
us to develop a better understanding of the conscious contents of infants, animals and 
artificial systems, whose sensory and sensorimotor contingencies are very different 
from our own. It could also help us to address some of the limitations of the current 
work on the neural correlates of consciousness that were identified by Noë and 
Thompson [45].  
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported by Barry Cooper’s grant from the John Templeton Founda-
tion (ID 15619: 'Mind, Mechanism and Mathematics: Turing Centenary Research 
Project'). I would also like to thank Anil Seth and the Sackler Centre for Conscious-
ness Science at the University of Sussex for hosting me as a Research Fellow during 
this project. 
References 
1. Gamez, D.: Information and Consciousness. Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, XIII, 215-
234 (2011) 
2. Floridi, L.: Philosophical Conceptions of Information. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 
5363, 13-53 (2009) 
3. O'Regan, J.K., Noë, A.: A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, 939-973 (2001) 
4. Keeley, B.L.: Making Sense of the Senses: Individuating Modalities in Humans and Other 
Animals. The Journal of Philosophy 99, 5-28 (2002) 
5. Aleksander, I.: The world in my mind, my mind in the world. Imprint Academic, Exeter 
(2005) 
6. Noë, A.: Out of our heads. Hill and Wang, New York (2009) 
7. O'Regan, J.K.: Why red doesn't sound like a bell: Understanding the feel of consciousness. 
Oxford University Press, New York ; Oxford (2011) 
8. Chalmers, D.: What Is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness? In: Metzinger, T. (ed.) Neural 
Correlates of Consciousness, pp. 17-39. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts (2000) 
9. Pockett, S.: How long is “now”? Phenomenology and the specious present. Phenomenol 
Cogn Sci 2, 55-68 (2003) 
10. Brindley, G.S., Lewin, W.S.: The sensations produced by electrical stimulation of the 
visual cortex. J Physiol 196, 479-493 (1968) 
11. Penfield, W.: Some mechanisms of consciousness discovered during electrical stimulation 
of the brain. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 44, 51-66 (1958) 
12. Bach-y-Rita, P.: Brain mechanisms in sensory substitution. Academic Press, New York ; 
London (1972) 
                                                          
20 Humans might have a vomeronasal organ whose sensory contingencies are not correlated 
with conscious sensations [4, 44]. 
21 The resolution of the different senses would be one place to look for an explanation. 
13. Lenay, C., Gapenne, O., Hanneton, S., Marque, C., Genouëlle, C.: Sensory Substitution: 
Limits and Perspectives. In: Hatwell, Y., Streri, A., Gentaz, E. (eds.) Touching for 
Knowing. John Benjamins Publishing, Amsterdam & Philadelphia (2003) 
14. Guarniero, G.: Experience of tactile vision. Perception 3, 101-104 (1974) 
15. Kupers, R., Fumal, A., de Noordhout, A.M., Gjedde, A., Schoenen, J., Ptito, M.: 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation of the visual cortex induces somatotopically organized 
qualia in blind subjects. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 103, 13256-13260 (2006) 
16. Block, N.: Tactile sensation via spatial perception. Trends Cogn Sci 7, 285-286 (2003) 
17. Prinz, J.J.: Putting the Brakes on Enactive Perception. Psyche 12, (2006) 
18. Chandrashekar, J., Hoon, M.A., Ryba, N.J., Zuker, C.S.: The receptors and cells for 
mammalian taste. Nature 444, 288-294 (2006) 
19. Noe, A.: Action in perception. MIT, Cambridge, Mass. ; London (2004) 
20. Gregory, R.L., Wallace, J.G.: Recovery from Early Blindness - A Case Study. Heffers, 
Cambridge (1963) 
21. Kohler, I., Fiss, H.: The formation and transformation of the perceptual world. Translated 
by Harry Fiss. Introduction by James J. Gibson. New York: International Universities 
Press (1964) 
22. Tononi, G., Koch, C.: The neural correlates of consciousness: an update. Ann N Y Acad 
Sci 1124, 239-261 (2008) 
23. Sur, M., Angelucci, A., Sharma, J.: Rewiring cortex: the role of patterned activity in 
development and plasticity of neocortical circuits. J Neurobiol 41, 33-43 (1999) 
24. Ptito, M., Giguère, J.-F., Boire, D., Frost, D.O., Casanova, C.: When the auditory cortex 
turns visual. In: Casanova, C., Ptito, M. (eds.) Vision: From Neurons to Cognition. 
Elsevier Science, Amsterdam (2001) 
25. Frost, D.O., Boire, D., Gingras, G., Ptito, M.: Surgically created neural pathways mediate 
visual pattern discrimination. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 97, 11068-11073 (2000) 
26. Ahrens, M.B., Keller, P.J.: Whole-brain functional imaging at cellular resolution using 
light-sheet microscopy. Nature Methods (2013) 
27. Gamez, D., Fidjeland, A.K., Lazdins, E.: iSpike: A Spiking Neural Interface for the iCub 
Robot. Bioinspiration and Biomimetics 7, 025008 (2012) 
28. Fontaine, B., Goodman, D.F., Benichoux, V., Brette, R.: Brian hears: online auditory 
processing using vectorization over channels. Front Neuroinform 5, 9 (2011) 
29. Izhikevich, E.M., Edelman, G.M.: Large-scale model of mammalian thalamocortical 
systems. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 105, 3593-3598 (2008) 
30. Markram, H.: The blue brain project. Nat Rev Neurosci 7, 153-160 (2006) 
31. Horikawa, T., Tamaki, M., Miyawaki, Y., Kamitani, Y.: Neural Decoding of Visual 
Imagery During Sleep. Science (2013) 
32. Nishimoto, S., Vu, A.T., Naselaris, T., Benjamini, Y., Yu, B., Gallant, J.L.: Reconstructing 
visual experiences from brain activity evoked by natural movies. Curr Biol 21, 1641-1646 
(2011) 
33. Tononi, G.: Consciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto. Biol Bull 
215, 216-242 (2008) 
34. Sparkes, A., Aubrey, W., Byrne, E., Clare, A., Khan, M.N., Liakata, M., Markham, M., 
Rowland, J., Soldatova, L.N., Whelan, K.E., Young, M., King, R.D.: Towards Robot 
Scientists for autonomous scientific discovery. Automated Experimentation 2, 1 (2010) 
35. Dzeroski, S., Todorovski, L. (eds.): Computational discovery of scientific knowledge : 
introduction, techniques, and applications in environmental and life sciences. Springer, 
Berlin (2007) 
36. Schmidt, M., Lipson, H.: Distilling free-form natural laws from experimental data. Science 
324, 81-85 (2009) 
37. Gamez, D.: From Baconian to Popperian Neuroscience. Neural Systems and Circuits 2, 2 
(2012) 
38. Rensink, R.A., O'Regan, J.K., Clark, J.J.: To See or Not to See: The Need for Attention to 
Perceive Changes in Scenes. Psychological Science 8, 368-373 (1997) 
39. Simons, D.J., Chabris, C.F.: Gorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness for 
dynamic events. Perception 28, 1059-1074 (1999) 
40. Melzack, R.: Phantom limbs. Scientific American 266, 120-126 (1992) 
41. Bach-y-Rita, P., S, W.K.: Sensory substitution and the human-machine interface. Trends 
Cogn Sci 7, 541-546 (2003) 
42. Nagel, S.K., Carl, C., Kringe, T., Martin, R., Konig, P.: Beyond sensory substitution--
learning the sixth sense. J Neural Eng 2, R13-26 (2005) 
43. Bystritsky, A., Korb, A.S., Douglas, P.K., Cohen, M.S., Melega, W.P., Mulgaonkar, A.P., 
DeSalles, A., Min, B.K., Yoo, S.S.: A review of low-intensity focused ultrasound 
pulsation. Brain Stimul 4, 125-136 (2011) 
44. Meredith, M.: Human vomeronasal organ function: a critical review of best and worst 
cases. Chem Senses 26, 433-445 (2001) 
45. Noë, A., Thompson, E.: Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness? Journal of 
Consciousness Studies 11, 3-28 (2004) 
 
 
